On the issue of how much pragmatics has to do with what is said, philosophers and linguists divide into the minimalist and contextualist camps. Most members of both camps agree that in utterance comprehension, there are clear cases of 'pragmatic intrusion.' The consensus is practically universal, when it comes to utterances containing indexicals, demonstratives and context-sensitive expressions in general. The basic idea is that without pragmatic provision of appropriate referents, no proposition is determined, so the hearer cannot very well
Introduction
There are few assumptions in contemporary pragmatic theory as universal as what we will call 'incompletism'. With this ugly word, we refer to the claim that, in utterance comprehension, in the absence of the operation of certain pragmatic processes, an utterance often fails to determine a complete, fully truthevaluable proposition. It delivers only an incomplete proposition, something that in and by itself cannot have a truth-value. This may be identified as a subpropositional 'logical form ', a 'partial' or 'gappy' proposition, a propositional 'fragment', 'schema', 'radical', 'skeleton', 'template', 'matrix', or 'scaffolding.' 1 All serve as national', 'imported', and 'exported'. Hence, the only kind of context-sensitivity admitted is indexicality (which alludes to the context-sensitivity proper of indexicals, demonstratives and contextuals). About the third issue, they are almost alone in holding that, for example, an utterance of 'It's raining' expresses a complete proposition even without the pragmatic provision of a location for the raining-event; and so does an utterance of 'Tipper is ready' even without knowing what she is supposed to be ready for. When pressed, they are happy to answer in the following terms:
2 Bach claims that there is no much sense in talking about incomplete propositions: "An incomplete proposition is no more a proposition than a sentence fragment is a sentence or a rubber duck is a duck" (Bach 2006: 441-2 ). That's why he opts for the term 'propositional radical'. Nevertheless, Bach himself talked about incomplete propositions in 'Conversational Impliciture ' (1994) and many other places.
• An utterance of 'It is raining' expresses the proposition that it is raining, which is true if and only if it is raining.
• An utterance of 'Tipper is ready' expresses the proposition that Tipper is ready, which is true if and only if Tipper is ready.
Most people disagree with Cappelen & Lepore, and think that locations must be provided for weather reports, and some other As long as you have a basic knowledge of English, and you assume that the speaker is talking literally, with the ordinary meaning of those words and their composition, and that she is making an assertion and not, for instance, just reading aloud a poem she just wrote, there is a sense in which you can rightly say that you understood the utterance. You understood the words uttered but you didn't understand what the speaker said, in the philosophers' and linguists' usual favored sense of the verb 'to say'. The fact that you have no clue about the context of the utterance that permits you to identify the speaker of (1) makes your understanding of (1) (1986 ( , 2002 ( ), Carston (2007 and Curcó (2013) argue against Recanati on this point. But they all agree, minimalists and contextualists alike, that saturation, whatever you call it and however you characterize it, is a mandatory pragmatic process.
And it is mandatory for the sole reason that, otherwise, the utterance would provide only an incomplete proposition.
In this paper, we argue against this consensus opinion. We argue that 1) there are no mandatory primary pragmatic processes; because 2) even without the provision of referents for referential expressions (or locations for weather reports)
an utterance does determine a complete proposition. This proposition will typically not be 'the proposition expressed' or 'what is said' by the speaker. But it is a complete proposition that captures truth-conditions for the utterance. Thus, primary pragmatic processes are not needed to have such a proposition.
If primary pragmatic processes are mandatory it is not due to
incompletism.
We'll start by summing up the differences between primary and secondary pragmatic processes according to Recanati (2004) and the allegedly mandatory nature of some of the former. Then we'll focus on the assumptions behind the main argument for that 
Recanati on pragmatic processes
Recanati (2004) "When a sentence is in this way semantically under-determinate, understanding its utterance requires a process of completion to produce a full proposition." (Bach 1994, p. 125) Without completion (or saturation), no full proposition, ergo no understanding. That's the claim.
Underdeterminacy, propositionalism and incompletism
The main argument for the obligatory nature of saturation or completion is incompletism. But the route from incompletism to 
Sentence versus utterance
Consider again the sentence uttered in (1), namely, 'I am French'. The sentence itself does not determine a complete proposition. If we adopt a token-reflexive account of indexicals and assume that the meaning of 'I' is something like 'the speaker of this utterance' then, at most we will have a 'gappy'
proposition with a slot to be filled in by a particular utterance of that sentence, something like:
This is indeed a propositional function, that is, an incomplete proposition. That's the most an indexical sentence can aspire to provide in propositional terms: a semi-gappy-incomplete propositional function-radical-template.
6 The reason for the parenthetical plural is that as a natural consequence of our discussion, we will argue that the utterance, not the sentence, has a variety of contents or truth-conditions. (2012) calls a 'token'. In that case, we might be unable to identify the speaker of the utterance, or the time, or the place, independently of the utterance ---which may itself only be identifiable as "the production of this token". Hence we talk of "utterance-bound" identification of the speaker, the time, the place, and in fact of the truth-conditions of the utterance.
Suppose you find an anonymous hand-written note, apparently slid under your office-door, that reads (n) You are Spanish.
You don't have any hint about its author, 8 its addressee or addressees, the time it was written or placed there, or its purpose. The utterance-bound truth-conditions, or utterancebound content, of (n), however, is available to you:
(7) The addressee(s) of n meet the conditions the author of n means by 'Spanish' at the time of being said.
Whether the referent of 'you' is a sole person, all the occupants of the office or just some of them and who exactly he, she or they is/are is a matter of the speaker's intention that goes further than the facts determining the minimal utterance-bound content. About the meaning of 'Spanish' opinions can differ about whether it denotes a perfectly identifiable current European citizenship quite permanent in time, or it involves few things other than a passport which makes the denotation more intention-dependent and temporary. (7) stands for the latter option. Anyway, we know that the note has an author and has an issuing time, and that's all we need to existentially close our propositional function and have a complete proposition.
Coming back to (6), we call it the referential content or referential truth-conditions of the utterance, as we take utterances to have a variety of truth-conditions or contents; a variety of truth-conditions or contents that are set relative to various kinds of facts:
-the utterance-bound truth-conditions; set by the meaning of the sentence uttered plus the fact that an utterance has been produced.
-the speaker-bound truth-conditions; set by the above facts plus the identity of the speaker.
-the network-bound truth-conditions; set by the above facts plus the notion-network supporting the use of a certain proper name.
-...
-the referential truth-conditions; set by the above facts plus facts about the speaker's intentions and contextual facts that set the values for context-sensitive expressions as well as unarticulated constituents.
-... and some other truth-conditions that can be distinguished as the product of all the various facts about conventions, intentions and circumstances involved. To our present purposes, however, it is the first level of truth-conditions which is critical: the level of utterance-bound or reflexive truth-conditions, for they provide the proof that incompletism is false. It is false that without saturation we do not have a complete proposition. And thus it is false that saturation is mandatory to get a complete proposition.
Against utterance-bound or reflexive content
Suppose you are quite convinced by our arguments, but still you wish to defend that saturation is mandatory. You might try to object as follows. The closure of the incomplete parameters through the utterance parameters of speaker, time and place is just another way of saturating the incomplete proposition delivered by sentence meaning. If right, this would be a fatal objection to our argument, we would be just begging the question by an excessive narrow interpretation of 'saturation', and we wouldn't have refuted incompletism.
Remember that we deliberately choose to discuss only the non-controversial cases, indexicals and demonstratives. These "Ok, let's accept that your utterance-bound or reflexive content is a complete proposition that is determined before saturation. This is not an objection but a concession of our main claim:
incompletism is false, so saturation is not mandatory for that reason. But it can be used as a preliminary move to a further point: that the utterance-bound content has no role in a psychologically plausible account of utterance understanding. We can discard that already. What he said by (8) i.e., the utterance-bound content.
That's what they are to grasp, and from which they are to infer that there is an armed policeman in the house, and it's best to leave the house.
11
The example shows that the objections are misguided if directed to utterance-bound content. It doesn't amount to what is said ---we never said that---but it explains what understanding consists in in many cases and, hence, it plays an important role in explaining utterance understanding.
Thus, understanding what a speaker says in uttering a sentence is not necessary to understand the communicative act.
And it is not sufficient either. This morning the first words Kepa told his friends were:
(12) I am Basque.
They looked at him with puzzled faces. His communicative plan was to exploit the widely recognized fact that Basques are punctual, and so to complain that they were late and accuse them 11 One can build alternative explanations like: "they just heard an utterance; they didn't even understand the sentence; hearing a voice downstairs did all the work; Davis could have just uttered "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen?" and the robbers would have run all the same". These are all possible stories, but not the story we are using as an example. Our story is possible, and that's all that matters. 
True Neo-Griceans (or Neo-relevantists).
Perhaps contrary to appearances, our view on utterance contents is well-rooted in Grice's seminal work. It is also in substantial agreement with relevance theory, an important contemporary theory of utterance understanding that is rooted in Grice's ideas. Interpreted according to our view, the hearer might well stop at the utterance-bound content, without "going beyond linguistic meaning" and without "resolving referential indeterminacies", because the utterance-bound content is relevant enough---as in the McAlary example. Or she might go a bit further and stop at the speaker-bound content, or the network-bound content, without going through the process required to fix the referents of referential expressions. This is all that is needed for the inference of implicatures (which can be on-line, and in parallel), and other perlocutionary effects the speaker intends to generate. There is nothing that demands the PPPs to operate at all, because the utterance-bound content might be relevant enough, and being complete, there is no necessity of any saturation process to work.
Conclusions
We think it is now sufficiently clear that incompletism is false, and that, consequently, it does not justify the claim that saturation is mandatory. Reasons of 'full' utterance understanding are also wanting. Understanding 'what is said' is neither necessary nor sufficient to understand an utterance, and we believe that insisting on the contrary is the product of the 
